It is quite well-known from Kurt Gödel's (1931) ground-breaking result on the Incompleteness Theorem that rudimentary relations (i.e., those definable by bounded formulae) are primitive recursive, and that primitive recursive functions are representable in sufficiently strong arithmetical theories. It is also known, though perhaps not as well-known as the former one, that some primitive recursive relations (and functions) are not rudimentary. We present a simple and elementary proof of this fact in the first part of this paper. In the second part, we review some possible notions of representability of functions studied in the literature, and give a new proof of the equivalence of the weak representability with the (strong) representability of functions in sufficiently strong arithmetical theories. Our results shed some new light on the notions of rudimentary, primitive recursive, and representable functions and relations, and clarify, hopefully, some misunderstandings and confusing errors in the literature. 
Introduction and Preliminaries
Primitive recursive functions are what were called "rekursiv" by Kurt Gödel in his seminal 1931 paper [6, 7] where he proved the celebrated incompleteness theorem. The main features of the primitive recursive functions used by Göde were the following:
1. They are computable (i.e., for each primitive recursive function there exists an algorithm that computes it). However, we now know that they do not make up the whole (intuitively) computable functions (from tuples of natural numbers to natural numbers, N k → N). So, "rekursiv" functions are now called "primitive recursive" functions, which are a part of recursive functions that, by Church's Thesis, are believed to constitute the whole computable functions.
2. They are representable in (sufficiently expressive and sufficiently strong) formal arithmetical theories. It is now known that, more generally, (only) recursive functions are representable in recursively enumerable, sufficiently strong and sufficiently expressive theories (see Section 3 below).
3. Theories whose set of axioms are primitive recursive and extend a base theory (such as Robinson's Arithmetic Q), are incomplete. It was later found out that this holds more generally for recursively enumerable extensions of Q; also by Craig's Trick every such theory is equivalent with another theory whose set of axioms is rudimentary (i.e., definable by a bounded formula).
Even though one can set up the whole theory of computable functions (aka recursion theory) and the incompleteness theorems without introducing the notion of primitive recursive functions (and relations), the theory of primitive recursive functions is a main topic in the literature on recursive function theory and the incompleteness theorems (see [15] ). For the sake of completeness we review some basic notions of this theory. 
, and (II) the primitive recursion, i.e., contains the function h : N n+1 → N if it already contains the functions f : N n → N and g : N n+2 → N, where
✧
It can be easily shown that the addition and multiplication functions (+ : N 2 → N, (x, y) → x + y and × : N 2 → N, (x, y) → x · y) and the following sign functions are primitive recursive: 
DEFINITION 1.3 (Rudimentary Relations)
A formula in the language of arithmetic 0, 1, +, ·, is called bounded, if it has been constructed from atomic formulas (of the form t = s or t s for terms s, t) by means of negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, and bounded quantifications (of the form ∀x t or ∃x t where the formula ∀x t A(x, t) reads as ∀x x t → A(x, t) and ∃x t A(x, t) reads as
The class of bounded formulas is denoted by ∆ 0 .
A relation R ⊆ N n is called rudimentary or bounded definable, or simply ∆ 0 , if it can be defined by a ∆ 0 -formula, i.e., there exists a ∆ 0 -formula
We have already noticed that all ∆ 0 relations are PR; see e.g. [3, 9, 20] . The question as to whether the converse holds, i.e., whether every PR relation is ∆ 0 , has been mentioned in very few places. Unfortunately, as will be indicated, some of them are wrong or misleading:
(1) On page 315 of [9] ."
Graph of a function f : X → Y is, by definition, the relation
Let us note that for a PR function f its graph Γ f is a PR relation, since
. Now, since hex is a PR function, its graph is a PR relation. But the claim that this relation is not ∆ 0 has not been proved in [20] . In fact, it has been shown in [1] (see also [5] )
that this is not true: the graph of hex is actually ∆ 0 .
(3) We read in the Abstract of [5] , "The question of whether a given primitive recursive relation is rudimentary is in some cases difficult and related to several well-known open questions in theoretical computer science". Also, on page 130 of [5] we read, "However, it is difficult to exhibit a natural arithmetical relation which can be proved not to be rudimentary" and that "This paper is an attempt to systemize the use of these tools for proving that various primitive recursive relations are rudimentary". Later, on page 132 we read, "Hence, the main way of exhibiting a primitive recursive relation which is not rudimentary is to choose it in C 3 * \ C 2 * . Although it is true that infinitely many relations exist, we know no natural example". The mentioned side-remark (that "All ∆ 0 relations can be recognized in linear space on a Turing machine, when input numbers are represented in binary notation") has not been proved in [3] .
So, there should exist some PR relation that is not ∆ 0 . Its existence can be shown by a diagonal argument as in item (4) we will show that a specific PR relation is not ∆ 0 . This relation may not look natural for number-theorists but is sufficiently natural for logicians.
In the second part, Section 3, we will study some possible notions of representability of functions and relations in arithmetical theories and will compare their strength with each other; we will provide a new proof for an old theorem which appears in a very few places with a lengthy and tedious proof. The theorem says that every weakly representable function is (strongly) representable; this is usually proved by showing that (a) every weakly representable function is recursive, and (b) every recursive function is (strongly) representable. Our proof is direct and more elementary.
Rudimentarity vs. Primitive Recursivity
Let us fix the language of arithmetic as e.g. 0, 1, +, ·, and let us be given a fixed Gödel coding α → α which is primitive recursive (as is usually presented in the literature). 1 Presented by Leszek Aleksander KoÅĆodziejczyk through Zofia Adamowicz; warm thanks go to them both for this.
Our example of a PR relation that is not ∆ 0 , uses an idea of Alfred Tarski; that the truth relation of arithmetical sentences is not arithmetically definable. Likewise, the truth of ∆ 0 -sentences is not ∆ 0 ; but, as will be shown later, it is PR. DEFINITION 2.1 (∆ 0 -Satisfaction) Let Sat ∆ 0 be the set of all the ordered pairs ( θ(θ) , a) such that θ(θ) is a ∆ 0 -formula with the shown free variables, and a is a natural number, such that N θ(ā), i.e, the sentence resulted from substituting a for every free variable of θ is true (in the standard model of natural numbers). ✧
In the other words,
is not definable by any ∆ 0 -formula.
Proof:
If a ∆ 0 -formula such as ς(x, y) defines the relation Sat ∆ 0 , then for the formula θ(x) ≡ ¬ς(x, x) (which is ∆ 0 ) and number m = θ(x) , we have 
REMARK 2.3 (On Gödel Coding)
We can assume that the set of the Gödel codes of the variables is definable by a ∆ 0 -formula; for example we can keep even numbers 2, 4, 6, · · · for coding the variables v 0 , v 1 , v 2 , · · · respectively, and then code the rest of the language (propositional connectives, quantifiers, parentheses and function and relation symbols) by odd numbers. As a result of this way of coding, var(x) ≡ ∃y x (y = 2x + 2) is a ∆ 0 -formula that defines the variables. Other syntactical notions of terms, formulas, sentences, bounded sentences, proofs, etc. can be shown to be PR as usual (see e.g. [8, 9, 14, 15, 20] • var(x) hold, when "x is (the Gödel code of) a variable".
• trm(x) hold, when "x is (the Gödel code of) a term".
• atm(x) hold, when "x is (the Gödel code of) an atomic formula".
• fml ∆ 0 (x) hold, when "x is (the Gödel code of) a ∆ 0 -formula".
• val(x, y, z) hold, when "x is (the Gödel code of) a term with the free variables ν 0 , · · · , ν ℓ , y is (the Gödel code of) a sequence of numbers a 0 , · · · , a ℓ , and z is the value of the term x when each ν i is substituted with a i ". ✧ 
Proof:
We already noted (in Remark 2.3) that the var relation can even be ∆ 0 (and so it is a PR relation) by a modest convention on coding. There is also a ∆ 0 relation seq(x) which holds of x when x is (the Gödel code of) a sequence.
Let ℓen(x) denote the length of x and [x] i , for each i < ℓen(x), denote the i-th element of x. Thus, if seq(x) holds, then x codes the sequence • Let trmseq(x) be the following ∆ 0 relation:
Now, trm(x) can be written as ∃s p
trmseq(s) ∧ ℓast(s) = x; noting that the building sequence of a term x has length at most x and all the elements of that sequence are non-greater than x. So, trm(x) is PR.
• That atm(x) is a PR relation, follows from the following:
• Without loss of generality we can assume that the propositional connectives are only ¬ and → and the only quantifier is ∀. Now, the following ∆ 0 -formula defines the building sequence of a bounded formula:
• Let valseq(y, s, t) be the following ∆ 0 relation:
k , which states that y, t are (the Gödel code of) sequences (of numbers) and s is (the Gödel code of) a building sequence of a term such that t is the result of substituting the variables of s with the corresponding elements of y.
Finally, val(x, y, z) is PR since it is equivalent with can be ∆ 0 , under a suitable Gödel coding. In Theorem 2.7 we will show that Sat ∆ 0 (x, y) is a PR relation, which, by Theorem 2.2, cannot be ∆ 0 under any Gödel coding. We will see in the proof of Theorem 2.7 that Sat ∆ 0 is definable by the relations var, trm, atm, fml ∆ 0 and val. So, we have a boundary result here: the PR relations var(x), trm(x), atm(x), fml ∆ 0 (x) and val(x, y, z) all can be ∆ 0 under some coding, while the PR relation Sat ∆ 0 (x, y) can never be ∆ 0 . ✧
Define the relation sat ∆ 0 seq(s, t) by "s is a building sequence of a ∆ 0 -formula, and t is a sequence of triples i, z, w in which i < ℓen(s) and . The following formula defines the relation sat ∆ 0 seq(s, t):
. Therefore, sat ∆ 0 seq(s, t) is a PR relation, and so is Sat ∆ 0 (x, y) which can be written as ∃s p
Let us note that we took ¬, → as the only propositional connectives and ∀ as the only quantifier; and we coded i, z, w as 2 i · 3 z · 5 w which imply the desirable PR bounds as indicated. ❑
Representability in Arithmetical Theories
A (most) natural definition for representability of a relation on the natural numbers in a theory, whose language contains terms n indicating each natural number n ∈ N, is the following:
(Weak Representability of Relations)
A relation R ⊆ N is weakly representable in a theory T if for some formula ϕ(x) the equivalence R(n) ⇐⇒ T ⊢ ϕ(n) holds for every n ∈ N. ✧ Though, the following stronger definition is usually used in the literature on the incompleteness theorem:
Trivially, representability of a relation in a consistent theory implies its weaker representability in that theory. 
since Prov PA is a Σ 1 -formula and PA is Σ 1 -complete and sound. On the other hand, there can be no formula Ψ(x) such that for any formula ϕ:
• if Prov PA ( ϕ ) then PA ⊢ Ψ( ϕ ), and
• if ¬Prov PA ( ϕ ) then PA ⊢ ¬Ψ( ϕ ). Since otherwise provability in PA would be decidable: for a given formula ϕ by running an exhaustive proof search algorithm in PA for the formulas Ψ( ϕ ) and ¬Ψ( ϕ ) in parallel, one could decide if PA ⊢ ϕ (exactly when PA ⊢ Ψ( ϕ )) or PA ϕ (exactly when PA ⊢ ¬Ψ( ϕ )) holds; and this is a contradiction (with Gödel's first incompleteness theorem). ✧ For (total) functions we can have four different definitions for representability in theories (originated from [19] ). LEMMA 3.8 (Representability =⇒ Strong Representability) In a theory T which can prove the sentences ∀y(y < n ∨ y = n ∨ n + 1 < y), ∀y(y < 0) and ∀y(y < n ↔ y = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ y = n), for all n ∈ N, representability of a function implies its strong representability.
Proof: If f is representable by the formula ψ(x, y) in T , then let θ(x, y) be ψ(x, y) ∧ ∀z < y¬ψ(x, z). We now show that T ⊢ θ(n, f (n)) and T ⊢ θ(n, y) → y = f (n) hold for any n ∈ N as follows. Reason in T : If z < f (n) then if f (n) = 0 we have a contradiction, otherwise (if f (n) = 0) we have z = i for some i < f (n). Of course for any such i we have ¬ψ(n, i);
thus ¬ψ(n, z). If θ(n, y) and y = f (n) then either y < f (n) or f (n) < y.
In the former case we have y = i for some i < f (n), if f (n) = 0, otherwise y < 0 is a contradiction, and so by ¬ψ(n, i) we have ¬ψ(n, y) which is a contradiction with θ(n, y). In the latter case by ∀z < y¬ψ(n, z) we should have ¬ψ(n, f (n)); a contradiction again. For any n ∈ N we have T ⊢ ∃!y θ(n, y); thus from T ⊢ θ(n, f (n)) we get T ⊢ η(n, f (n)). Now, we show that T ⊢ ∀x∃!y η(x, y). (ii) T ⊢ ∀y(y n ∨ n y) for all n ∈ N; f (n) z, by (i) above, which also implies f (n) = m. On the other hand, we have Proof T (k, ϕ(n, f (n)) ) and so ∃u z Proof T (u, ϕ(n, f (n)) ), or equivalently ̺(z, ϕ(n, f (n)) ). Thus, ¬ψ(n, m) holds since we have f (n) z ∧ f (n) = m ∧ ̺(z, ϕ(n, f (n)) ). ❑ Let us note that the (very weak) finitely axiomatizable theory Q, Robinson's Arithmetic, satisfies all the conditions (i) -(v) in Theorem 3.10.
